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ABSTRACT  
 
Systemic risk is a very important but very complex notion in banking and how to measure it 
adequately is challenging. We introduce a new framework for measuring systemic risk by 
using a risk-adjusted balance sheet approach. The measure models credit risk of banks as a 
put option on bank assets, a tradition that originated with Merton. We conceive of an 
individual bank’s systemic risk as its contribution to the potential sector-wide net. In this 
regard, the analysis of public commercial banks operating in 7 countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe, shows potential risk which could threaten all the financial system. The paper 
shows how risk management tools can be applied in new ways to measure and analyze 
systemic risk in European banking system. The research results is a systemic risk map for the 
CEE banking systems. The study finds also instability of systemic risk determinants.  
JEL classification: G1, G11, G10, E44  
Keywords: systemic risk, banking system, instability, emerging markets, Merton option model  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past two decades, the Central and Eastern European financial systems experienced 
changes, including the opening to attract foreign investments, mainly big banking group,  the 
deconcentration of their banking sectors and the privatization of financial institutions. Such 
reforms during the early 1990s were expected to increase investment in the region and 
produce high profits by banking sector. 
The stability of CEE banking sectors should be examined  in the context of high foreign 
ownership by Western European banks in CEE. The aggregated CEE exposure of Western 
European banks remained more or less high in recent years. By year-end 2012, the aggregated 
CEE exposure of the three most important banking sectors for the region (Austria, Italy and 
France, representing some 50% of the total regional exposure of European banks or 45% of 
global cross-border CEE exposure)
1
. On the other hand given the systemic presence of 
Western European banks in the CEE there had been an extensive debate among academics 
and policy-makers about the efficiency of CEE comparing to Western European banks in 
recent years. Is it also a question if deleveraging of Western European banks within a short 
period of time might have disruptive effects for the CEE economies?  
Definition of systemic risk is related to the probability that a given size shock will generate a 
particularly severe and undesirable outcome. Systemic risk may be due to common exposures 
or from systemic interdependence due to information contagion, domino effects through 
contracts, fire sales and asset prices, and the breakdown of market making functions. 
Banking sector is by far the most central part of the financial system in most of the 
emerging economies and is, therefore, also the main source of risk for financial stability. 
Traditional banking models do not adequately measure risk position of financial institutions 
and cannot be used to understand risk within and between balance sheets in the financial 
sector. A fundamental subject is that accounting balance sheets do not indicate risk exposures, 
                                                          
1
 According to the OECD data base 
3 
 
which are forward-looking. Therefore, in the first step of this article we proposes the use of 
Merton's model, which is mainly used for option pricing as a way to assess the risk of 
insolvency of the company. The essence of this method is the connection of information 
coming from the company's balance sheet and market data, containing part of future 
expectations of market participants. In particular, it seems important to use option pricing 
methodology, which takes into account the information contained in the market prices about 
the increasing risks in the financial system. In the second step of research there will be 
investigating analysis  whether systemic risk of banks operating in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), is affected by bank size, risk taking, market determinants or country specific 
variables, like banking concentration and competition. The study is a continuation of previous 
studies carried CCA method for the Polish banking sector (Karkowska, 2012). 
Main hypothesis is: (1) Central and Eastern European banking systems are not devoid of 
systemic risk. The threat of a systemic crisis is ever-present. (2) Systemic risk has not pro-
cyclical determinants. It depends on market risk, the banking system specific conditions and 
risk taken by individual banks.  
The paper shifts focus from the country specific variables to financial institutions and 
the possible causal links between market variables and systemic risk changes. It was consider 
a set of CEE countries during a period of last seven years that enhanced financial prosperity 
and slump. It was examined whether country specific variables affects risk in banking system. 
To the best of ours knowledge, there is no work considering explicitly such a research of  
systemic risk in European countries and its determinates. 
To measure banking systemic risk it was using Merton's model.  And to test our main 
hypothesis and determinants of systemic risk it was employed a panel data framework using 
the generalized methods of moments (GMM).  
4 
 
The approach was applied to the 21 commercial banks covered by Central and Eastern Europe  
during the period from December 2004 to December 2012. The findings suggest that the 
systemic risk indicator stood at its peak in March 2009, but in Hungarian banking system is 
still high. Finally, it was find that the increase in systemic risk of the CEE banking sector 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis was initially driven mainly by bank specific risk premiums 
and later by the market determinants, like volatility and stock exchange capitalization. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the relevant literature on systemic 
risk and its reasons.  Section 3 outlines model specification and describes dependent and 
independent variables used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the data sample and 
methodology applied. Section 5 presents the results of the investigation. Section 6 concludes 
study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The problem of increasing systemic risk in the economy is again widely presented in the 
literature. Especially a lot on this subject can be read in the IMF reports (IMF, 2008; IMF 
2009).  
The wide scope of research about systemic risk show that there is not a single and  
agreed approach to this measurement. It suggests that measurements tools should support the 
understanding of linkages between financial institutions and the macroeconomy. The problem 
of systemic risk is complex and requires multiple measurements. The literature review finds a 
few specific approaches for assessing systemic risk along with different kind of data and 
models. 
The study of Brownlees and Engle (2011), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and 
Acharya et al. (2010) presented how to use tail-risk measures to estimate solvency of the 
5 
 
financial system. It measures interdependence in the tails of equity returns to financial 
institutions. MES measures the expected loss to each financial institution conditional on the 
entire set of institution s’ poor performance; CoVaR measures the value-at-risk (VaR) of 
financial institutions. 
 Estimation of tail dependence is problematic because of limited historical data of a 
financial crisis. The tail measurement helps to identify large aggregate shocks. This approach 
is interesting but has some critical questions – how equity returns transmitted disturbance to 
the macroeconomy? How big crisis could be expected? The tail measures is based on big 
public financial institutions. What about so-called shadow banking sector that are not publicly 
traded? The study of systemic risk measures based on analysis of equity returns emphasized 
also Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010).  
The second approach is network models of the financial system. The information about 
financial firm network is very useful in prediction disturbulances, but much more difficult to 
collect in dynamic financial system. Last time, Cont (2010) and Kim and Giesecke (2010) 
presented a network-based systemic risk measure. 
Smets and Wouters (2007) suggested dynamic and macroeconomic equilibrium models. 
This econometric estimation measures the transition mechanisms of shocks and its 
consequences for macroeconomy. The study remains a question how important is the model? 
And how to identify consequences of shocks that are very large but infrequent?  
The other research apply Gray and Jobst (2009), Gapen (2009) known as contingent 
claims analysis. It based on the use of option pricing theory for financial institutions where 
there is an underlying stochastic process for the value of their assets. This approach using 
investors market expectations in conjunction with equity-based measures of debt obligations 
uncertainty. The advantages of model is connection of market risk appetite with balance 
sheets statements.  
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The concept of credit risk measurement methods using CCA has a wide range of 
applications. American studies Gray and Malone (2011) used by central banks to support the 
analysis and management of financial risk management. The main analytical tool is the risk-
adjusted balance sheet, which shows the sensitivity of the company's assets and liabilities to 
external "shocks" on the national and international level. Traditional approaches may have a 
problem with the analysis of how risks can accumulate gradually and then suddenly erupt in 
times of crisis. The CCA model approach is designed to overcome any "non-linearity" in the 
assets and liabilities, and between institutions. Simulations and stress tests, using risk-adjusted 
balance sheets are managing systemic risk. 
Along Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005), Lehar (2005) and Avesani, Pascual, and Li 
(2006) show alternative systemic risk indicators - default probabilities based on the credit 
default swap (CDS), equity , or option market. 
Overview of the theoretical and empirical aspects of systemic risk measurement and 
management has enabled we to determine what was missed in previous studies and is the 
structural default risk modeling reasonable in CEE financial system? However, the using of  
multitude of methods caused unequivocal conclusions. There is no doubt, that the cause of it 
is the randomness of economic phenomena that can’t be properly described by statistical 
model. 
According to Schuermann, Pesaran, Treuler and Weiner, (2006) accounting balance 
sheets do not indicate risk exposures, which are forward-looking and express market risk. He 
has worked on linking the default risk of corporations with macroeconomic models. He 
underline that the main risk is frequently left out of our models default risk in the financial 
sector. Gray and Jobst, (2009:128-131) pointed out that study of financial volatility has not 
been well served by economic theory.  
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To manage and mitigate risk in financial sector there are needed new analytic tools and 
additional regulatory. Recent work has shown that financial sector risk indicators, such as the 
systemic expected losses or system default risk from Merton model, have big predictive 
power for GDP and the output gap Garcia, Gray, Luna and Restrepo, (2010). 
In view of the above literature review, we decides to use CCA method to calculate systemic 
risk in banking of European emerging markets. 
 
3. DETERMINANTS OF SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
The section describes the explanatory variables which will be use to analyze 
determinants of systemic risk scope and size, calculated using CCA method. of in commercial 
bank. 
Assessment of financial stability in general is made on a broad-spectrum of risk factors 
developing outside and inside the financial system respectively. Recent research on systemic 
risk has identified three main determinants for systemic crises: (1) Market and macroeconomy 
variables widespread financial imbalances that unravel with adverse effects on both 
intermediaries and markets, (2) Banking systems specific variables caused interbank 
contagion arising from the interconnectedness of banks through the interbank loan market, (3) 
Individual risk taking by commercial banks.  
3.1 Market and macroeconomy determinants 
Market and macroeconomy determinants are widely considered as one of the key 
indicators of financial instability (Demirguc¸ -Kunt et al., 2006). we focus on four such 
determinants: ON interbank rate spread as liquidity indicator, VIX - volatility index, stock 
exchange capitalization to GDP, central bank base rate, money market rate, real GDP 
growth. The choice of merket variable as ON interbank rate spread as liquidity indicator, 
central bank base rate, VIX - volatility index, stock exchange capitalization to GDP as the 
primary determinants of banking systems stability has been justified in the literature, which I 
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have mentioned above. Perhaps the typical source of financial instability is market 
dysfunction mostly due to liquidity problem. The liquidity ratio of the banking market is 
liquidity in the interbank market, where banks finance their investments. Narrow BID ASK 
spread of ON transaction means liquid market and access to money. In contrast wide indicates 
lack of transaction and bottlenecks in payments. Interbank loans granted to other financial 
institutions in the interbank market: the risk adjusted pricing of these loans takes into account 
the funding costs of the granting bank as well as the expected and unexpected loss. The 
funding of commercial banks is largely through interbank market credits, which appear to be 
inelastic in the liquidity crisis. related volatility in the market.  
The other indicator of risk appetite in stock exchange, measures by capitalization and 
volatility in stock exchange market. In my study it is emphasize by changes in VIX index and 
capitalization measures. Falls of return on assets can occur  when a shock is experienced. 
Several studies establish the significance of volatility as an important measure of financial 
soundness of the banking system, because of short sell problem. Bank threat liquidity problem 
when they can’t sell assets of its investment portfolio. Risk affecting by liquidity can effect 
banking sector banking instability. Each bank can issue and repurchase stocks at current 
market prices to optimise the capital structure.  
Economic cycle measure as GDP growth impacts on systemic risk by lending activity 
and by credit quality. The improvement in macroeconomic conditions increases demand for 
credit by enterprises and households so has a positive effect on the banks profitability but 
cause taking additional risk Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009). On the other hand, poor 
macroeconomic conditions can worsen the quality of the banking loan portfolio and 
consequently generate credit losses and increase banks default probability. Such conditions 
will result in increasing systemic risk in banking sector. The question is whether the systemic 
risk has procyclicality?  
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An environment of low interest rates in economy results in bigger competition among 
banks. It could cut the opportunity for banks to get appropriate prices for lending and deposits 
activity. It puts pressure on the margin and consequently negatively influences bank stability. 
On the other hand, high interest rates could result in the debt repayment difficulty among 
borrowers. Consequently, rising interest rate payments may lead to a higher number and 
volume of non-performing loans Karkowska, Chodnicka, Olszak (2013), García-Herrero et al. 
(2009) and Staikouras and Wood (2003).  
3.2  Banking sector specific variables 
Causal link between concentration or competition and stability in the financial sector 
can be found in theory and data. Into consideration there were taken five variables: Z-score as 
the ratio of return on assets plus capital-asset-ratio to the standard deviation of return on 
assets. It is an indicator of banking stability. A higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more 
stable. HHI (Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) as market concentrations across banking markets, 
CR5 is asset share of 5 largest banks, NPL - bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans. 
The relationship between competition/concentration and stability is ambiguous in the 
academic literature. It can be distinguished two opposing views: the first one points to a 
negative relationship between competition and stability. The second one instead to a positive 
influence of competition on stability. If we consider systemic risk as the situation, when banks 
are unable to fulfill their intermediation function, the typically measures is market 
concentration, such as HHI. But market contestability is also important for evaluating 
competition in financial markets. The existence of entry barriers must be taken into account in 
evaluating financial system in a dynamic sense. A study using cross-country data set on 134 
countries for the period 1993-2004 provides evidence of a positive relationship between 
competition and stability (Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal, 2006).  On the other the study of 
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Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) measures competition with the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index and stability with various measures of the probability of bank failure such 
as the z-score and the NPL, finds that institutions with a higher HHI are more likely to fail.  
3.3 Bank’s individual risk taking 
As banking sector specific determinants of bank efficiency it was used five variables: 
bank capital to assets ratio, leverage as bank equity to total assets measure, liquidity gap 
measured as customer lending less customer borrowing normalized by customer lending, ROA 
- Average Return on Assets (Net Income/Total Assets) and ROE - Average Return on Equity 
(Net Income/Total Assets).  
It was used capital to assets ratio as a measure of solvency risk. Anticipating the effect 
of changes in this variable is complex. Too high as well as too low values of capital ratio are 
not desirable in terms of bank operating efficiency. Sufficiently high capitalized banks are 
safer and remain profitable even in times of economic difficulties. Such banks benefit from 
both reduced funding costs and reduced need for external financing, which may have a 
positive effect on their stability. 
Large changes in the liquidity of banks may perhaps indicate a crisis. As a result, 
liquidity risk may turn into solvency risk. Solvency risk can thus be affected by both asset 
return risk and liquidity risk. Further, banking crises indicator was employed by Demirguc¸ -
Kunt and Detragiache (2008) in which liquidity and solvency is a significant factor in analysis 
of banking instability. 
There are two basic channels of propagation financial crisis — leverage and liquidity 
gap. Excessive leverage and funding gap make the real economy more fragile to adverse 
shocks. They act as amplifying mechanisms, increasing the effects of solvency and liquidity 
crisis on the wider economy (BoE, 2009:14, 16; Brunnermeier, Pedersen, 2009).  Both 
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leverage, as a measure of solvency risk of a bank, and funding gap, as a measure of liquidity 
risk, can become excessive. Negative values for liquidity gap suggest low liquidity risk. The 
higher the positive value of liquidity gap the higher is liquidity risk. Excessively negative 
value of liquidity gap may be a proof of bank’s inability to convert deposits into income 
earning assets. But extremely large positive values of this measure indicate excessive 
dependence of banks on retail money markets, which may bring about vulnerability of banks 
to financial crises. The recent global financial crisis is mostly attributed to build-up of 
excessive leverage. The study was focus on two measures of bank efficiency: ROA and ROE, 
to investigate whether systemic risk of banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe is 
affected by profitability. In order to test the hypotheses it was implemented the quantitative 
measures presented in Table 1 to capture above mentioned dimensions of stability in a 
comparative static analysis. 
Table 1 Systemic risk determinants 
Target complex/ variables: Measure(s): Expected effect  
on systemic risk: 
 
 
Market and 
macroeconomy: 
LIQUIDITY ON BID ASK spread Positive 
MONETARY central bank base rate ??? 
VIX VIX volatility index Positive 
CAP 
indicator of stock exchange 
capitalization to GDP 
Positive 
MMR money market rate ??? 
GDP real GDP growth Negative 
 
 
Banking sector 
specific variables: 
 
 
HHI 
Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index as market 
concentrations 
 
??? 
NPL bank nonperforming loans 
to total gross loans  
Negative 
 
 
Bank’s individual  
risk taking: 
CAPITAL bank capital to assets ratio Positive 
LEVERAGE bank equity to total assets Negative 
 
 
LIQUIDITY GAP 
liquidity gap (customer 
lending - customer 
borrowing) customer 
lending 
negative 
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ROA Average Return on Assets 
(Net Income/Total Assets) 
Positive 
Source: own study 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The study was divided into two part: the first one, in which it was calculated systemic 
risk in selected European banking systems, using Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA); the 
second one, in which it was estimated systemic risk determinants.   
In the first step - CCA method of systemic risk measures has been used to estimate the 
market value of the assets of European commercial banks listed on stock exchange. In the 
study it was applied quarterly data from a period of December 2004 - December 2012, 
because of limited availability of banking variables, which are listed on stock exchange.  
 Bank-level data from 2004 through 2012 (49 quarterly periods) are constructed from two 
sources. Stock prices and returns are obtained from Eikon Thomson Reuters. Quarterly 
balance sheet accounting data come from Bankscope. Macroeconomic data are downloaded 
from the website maintained by the OECD. It was conducted for the selected 21 largest 
commercial banks, listed on stock exchange from seven Central and Eastern European 
countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania. They 
were choosen only 21 banks, because that is all, that are traded in a public market (for which 
data were available). General characteristics of the data are presented in Table 3. 
4.1 CCA method description 
In order to understand the individual institutional exposure to systemic risk in times of 
crisis, the method of the CCA and its technique of using risk-based balance sheets of financial 
institutions are worth analyzing. The CCA method assumes that the total market value of  
bank assets at any time T is equal to the sum of the market value of equity E and its "risky" 
debt D at time T. The term of "risky debt" is due to the fact that there is always a chance of 
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company  insolvency. The regulation of payment of "risky debt" depends on the quality of 
bank assets, therefore being a claim against the assets of uncertain value. This type of claim is 
known as a conditional claim. The methodology of the study has been presented previously 
by Karkowska (2012). 
At the time of bankruptcy shareholders receive payment in the amount of A-B, if A> B, 
or do not receive anything if A <B, where A is the market value of the assets, B – the 
liabilities (without equity). Similarly, we can compare the situation of a shareholder to that of 
a holder of a call option on the assets of the company. Exercise of the option occurs when it is 
in-the-money, which means A> B, while in the opposite situation, when the option is out-of-
the-money, the shareholder does not exercise it (the situation of loss of the ability to pay 
where A  B). 
The CCA method describes the relation between the value of assets and the capital of 
the analyzed subject, derived from the theory of Black-Scholes option pricing model (Hull, 
Nelken, White, 2003). 
ET=max[AT-B, 0]      (4.1)  
where: 
ET - value of equity at the time T,  
Assets take a random distribution and may fall below the value of liabilities which is equal to 
the level of a bank failure B (often referred to as the "default point" or "distress barrier"). 
Using the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the value of equity can be expressed as an implied 
call option on the bank assets with an exercise price equal to the level of B, which is 
expressed by the formula (4.1) (Gray, Jobst, Malone, 2011).  
ET=AT N(d1) – Be
-rT
 N(d2)         (4.2) 
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where:  
E
T 
– option value equal to the value of the bank capital at the time T,  
A
T 
– value of the underlying bank assets at the time T, 
B – exercise price equal to the value of liabilities, 
r – risk free rate, 
T – time to maturity option, 
N(d
i
) – value of the distribution function for a standardized normal distribution equal to the 
argument d
i
, where i=1, 2 
N(d2) – probability of exercising a call option, 
1-N(d2) = N(-d2) – probability of losing the ability to pay, 
d1=[ln(AT/B) + (r+σA
2/2)T]( σA√T)
-1 
d2=d1 - σA√T 
σA – bank assets volatility. 
In the model, the variables E, B, T, r are directly observable, but the market value of bank 
assets (A) and its volatility (σA) are not directly observable. Therefore, in order to estimate the 
market value of the asset and its variability the relationship (Hull, 2003) was used as well. 
σE E = N(d1) σA A,                                                        (4.3) 
where:  
σE – volatility of the bank equity. 
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With equations (4.2) and (4.3) we can calculate the market value of bank assets (A) and 
its volatility (σA) by successive iterations by comparing the two equations to zero. 
AT N(d1) – Be
-rT
 N(d2) - ET = 0     (4.4) 
N(d1) σA A - σE E = 0                                                      (4.5) 
 
Minimizing the value of the expression (4.6) estimate the value of assets and volatility: 
 [AT N(d1) – Be
-rT
 N(d2) - ET ]
2 
+ [(N(d1) σA A - σE E]
2
  min   (4.6) 
The estimated value is a market asset value, as assessed by investors. Let us assume that 
the relevant bank has a simple structure of financing (equity and foreign liabilities with 
maturity T). The bank’s loss of the ability to pay occurs when at the time T the value of the 
assets is smaller than the liabilities. It follows that the loss of solvency is a function of the 
capital structure, the volatility rate of return on assets and the current market value of assets. 
When marking the probability to lose the ability to pay by the bank Pdef we get: 
Pdef = Pr [V  Vdef] = Pr [lnV  Vdef]     (4.7) 
When estimating the probability of losing the ability to pay in the KMV model defined 
by (4.7), we assume that the random variable – the return on assets adopts normal distribution, 
and therefore can be represented as a cumulative normal distribution of Pdef. Which means 
that we can find the value of a normally distributed variable Z, that decline in the value of 
assets below this level will mean the bank loss of the ability to pay: 
Pdef = Pr[lnA0 +[(μ - t + Zt ln Adef]    (4.8) 
After the appropriate transformations we can determine the probability as: 
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Pdef = Pr [ Pr  = N(-d2) (4.9) 
where: 
Pdef – probability of the bank failure, 
V0 – market assets value, 
Vdef – limit of the assets value  resulting in bankruptcy, 
σA – asset volatility, 
 – the actual expected rate of return on assets, 
t – time to option expiration. 
The algorithm (4.9) is defined in literature as a DtD - Distance to Default, the number of 
standard deviations between the expected value of assets and the level of causing the loss of 
ability to pay. Use the process of estimating the likelihood of using KMV estimator turns out 
to be a better credit risk than the actual statistics of rating agencies - such conclusions were 
reached in the studies by (Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek, 2007). The distribution of 
assets at time T of the selected barrier solvency is presented in the Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Distribution of assets and the process of finding the probability of default 
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As the risk-free rate is the central bank’s reference rate, while the market value of equity 
is adopted as the capitalization of individual banks on the stock exchange. Finally we find the 
market value of banking assets, based on market participants' expectations. The calculation of 
the market assets value is based on Merton’s model and were calculated by means of 
Microsoft Excel Solver. As the indicator of systemic risk is difference between calculated 
market value of banking sector assets and the book value. Positive values indicate that there is 
a surplus of the market value of bank assets over book value (there is no systemic risk). On 
the other hand, negative values suggest that market participants assessed the value of bank 
assets below book value and the bank may have problems with solvency. Differences in asset 
values are presented in Table 2 for each bank individually and for the whole banking sector in 
each country. 
4.2 Systemic risk determinants panel model 
Because the results showed a large discrepancy we decided to look for reasons for the 
different phenomena. In the second step it has been investigated determinants of calculated 
systemic risk in banking systems of CEE country. It was applied the 21 banks covered by 
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largest commercial banks listed on stock exchange. As the estimation model was used  one – 
step Arellano – Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent 
variable. The model data sources and descriptions are preseted in Table 3. The final version of 
the model is given by equation (4.10) below: 
  (4.10) 
where: 
  is the income statement component examined, i.e. systemic risk SRISKj,t;  
 is a vector of explanatory variables, i.e. : 
, where: LIQUIDITYi,j is log of ON spread, MONETARYi,j is central bank base rate, VIXi,j is 
log of  CBOE VIX volatility index, CAPi,j is indicator of stock exchange capitalization to 
GDP, MMRi,j – money market rate, GDPi,j is the GDP growth. HHIi,j (Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index) as market concentrations across banking markets, NPL - bank nonperforming loans to 
total gross loans, CAPITALi,j - bank capital to assets ratio, LEVERAGEi,j is bank equity to total 
assets, LGAPi,j is the liquidity gap measured as customer lending less customer borrowing 
normalized by customer lending, ROAi,j - Average Return on Assets (Net Income/Total 
Assets), ,  is a vector of year-dummies;   is an unobservable time-invariant country effect. 
Panel model determinantes descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4. 
Due to the fact that the consistency of GMM estimator depends on the validity of 
instruments applied in the model (4.10), it was consider two specification tests suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). The first, is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
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checks the overall validity of the instruments. The other, examines  the hypothesis of absence 
of second-order serial correlation  in the first-difference residuals.  
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this paper, it was used CCA methodology to measure the systemic risk of banking 
systems in selected CEE countries.  It was applied this methodology to the 21 banks covered 
by largest commercial banks listed on stock exchange. The study finds the estimation of 
market assets value in individual commercial banks and total in CEE coutries. The indicator 
of systemic risk is difference between calculated market value of banking assets and the book 
value. Positive values indicate that there is a surplus of the market value of bank assets over 
book value (there is no risk systemic risk). On the other hand, negative values suggest that 
market participants assessed the value of bank assets below book value and the bank may 
have problems with solvency. The results of the 2006-2012 period of time are presented in 
Table 2.  It was creating a map of risk in CEE banking systems.  
The highest values of systemic risks shall cover the period of the financial crisis 
(September 2008 - June 2009) in the banking system Polish and Hungarian. In the individual 
analysis most threatened were: BRE Bank, Bank BPH, OTP Bank. The period before the 
crisis, most of it can be assumed to be safe, with the exception of individual units: ING Bank, 
Bank BPH and Latvijas Krajbanka. Wonder and anxiety can raise the fact that there is still a 
danger systemic risk in the CEE countries that are considered safe. The study showed that 
even in December 2012, the analysis showed worrying developments in Hungary, where the 
underestimation of OTP Bank's assets fall below EUR 3 000 million. Also questionable 
situation is in: the Bulgarian, Romanian, Lithuanian and Latvian banking system. Risk map 
shows that only individual banks, such as the Czech Komercni Banka, Bulgarian Corporate 
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Commercial Bank, the Polish Bank Pekao and PKO BP did not show systemic risk threat 
throughout the research. 
The second step of research finds systemic risk determinants. Results suggest that the 
systemic risk  in the banking sector is driven initially by mainly by bank specific risk 
premiums and later by the market determinants, like volatility and stock exchange 
capitalization. Table 6 reports the results of analysis of three groups of factors: 1/ market and 
marco determinants, 2/ banking sector specific variables, 3/ risk taking by individual banking. 
The first part of Table 5 reports the results of market and macro determinants. SRISK is 
significantly affected by only market specific variable, i.e. negative by stock exchange 
capitalization CAP and positive by volatility VIX. The positive impact of VIX on SRISK 
suggests that with rising volatility in the market, the banking systems instability. The negative 
impact of CAP is probably connected with a decrease in the possibility of liquidity regulating 
by banks during periods of downturn. In the regression (No1) a significant influence also 
proved to be LIQUIDITY in the interbank market. It is the results of traditional activity in 
CEE banking systems - the interbank market is used as a source of money loans and deposit 
for banks. Lack of liquidity in this market raises a number of instability risks. Liquidity is a 
significant factor in analysis of banking instability employed by Demirguc¸ -Kunt and 
Detragiache (2008). 
Marco determinants, as GDP, monetary policy and interest rates proved to be no 
significant impact on the variability of systemic risk in CEE countries. The interactions 
between the value of GDP growth and the changes in banks stability are mostly negative but 
not significant.  Our lagged dependent variable, which measures the degree of persistence of 
our systemic risk is statistically significant across all models, indicating a high degree of 
persistence of bank instability and justifying the use of a dynamic model. 
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In the second part of Table 5 (regression No2) it was estimated also the impact of 
banking sector specific variables. Systemic risk is mostly dependent on variables specific to 
the banking sector. Variable significantly affecting the volume of systemic risk is change in 
the banking systems concentration - more concentrated market improved probability of 
systemic crisis. In each of the models important and positive factor is non-performing loans 
NPL.  It suggests a significant impact of credit risk and solvency on the stability of the CEE 
banking systems.  
The last final model (regression No3) include also individual banks factors. Taking 
into account the liquidity (LGAP) and solvency (LEVERAGE) risks taken by individual 
commercial banks, it should be noted that although the effect is statistically significant but it 
is the smallest. The results are not in line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Without 
affecting the increase of systemic risk is banks efficiency - ROA. Another words raising 
banking systems profitability, the systemic risk is not increasing. Similar results we obtained 
by analyzing the equity to assets indicator.    
6. CONSLUSION 
The aim of the study was to calculate the systemic risk in CEE banking systems and 
identify its changes. Also it was investigated the determinants of these banking instability 
using panel regression models. Our results present interesting conclusions. Firstly, the study 
supports to the recent economist study on the increased systemic risk complexity and 
heterogeneity. The results show that banking instability is changing across countries and time. 
There is still a problem of systemic risk in CEE banking systems. The measures is not perfect, 
as was mentioned in the introduction has flaws, but it seems to be considered to support 
policy discussion and analysis. May be as CEE banking early warning indicators, such as in 
the stress testing exercise. Models provide measurement frameworks and facilitate 
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communication and criticism. The study could be the step to expanded new regulation and put 
pressures on banking supervision to develop useful measurements of systemic risk. Secondly, 
it was created the map of the most and the least instable individual bank and banking systems 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The above-mentioned decomposition could be used to 
examine to what degree the CEE banking instability can be explained by the risk premium 
versus default risk component. In the third, banking systemic risk dependent on many factors, 
as: banking systems specific variables, market volatility and liquidity. A decomposition 
analysis shows that the individual banks factors are marginal contributions to the systemic 
risk. The indicators are determined mostly by outside determinants, consistent with the 
banking systems concentration and correlation. Primary risk management of the financial 
system came down to the concept of a central bank as a lender of last resort before releasing 
domino effect. This concept has proved ineffective. Research has shown limited possibilities 
for monetary policy. And finally, the study finds negative relation between banking system 
stability and GDP cycle, which confirm hypothesis that systemic risk in CEE banking is not 
procyclical. It partly explain why different commercial banks had distinct contribution to the 
global crisis. 
Nevertheless, confronting the various analysis of uncertainty with some measurability 
will help us to use models in meaningful ways. 
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Table 2 Systemic risk map in CEE banking systems during the period December 2012 - December 2006 (in mln EUR) 
Bank 
Dec’
12 
 Jun’
12 
 Mar’
12 
 Dec’
11 
 Sep’
11 
 Jun’
11 
 Mar’
11 
 Dec’
10 
 Sep’
10 
 Jun’
10 
 Mar’
10 
 Dec’
09 
 Sep’
09 
 Jun’
09 
 Mar’
09 
 Dec’
08 
 Sep’
08 
 Jun‘
08 
 Mar’
08 
 Dec’
07 
 Sep’
07 
 Jun’
07 
 Mar’
07 
 Dec’
06 
Bulgarian-Amer 
Credit Bank -12 -46 -51 -53 -65 -56 -39 -32 -35 -42 -11 2 15 -40 -59 -35 157 305 362 442 462 470 370 
 Centr. Cooper. Bank -98 -145 -137 -129 -112 -94 -76 -105 -92 -88 -77 -78 -73 -86 -111 -107 -8 73 124 302 254 254 205 196 
Corp. Comer. Bank 21 18 20 48 45 49 80 29 21 43 38 27 20 34 42 40 134 169 158 
     First Invest.Bank -87 -171 -143 -139 -107 -62 -40 -104 -113 -109 -95 -88 -65 -121 -174 -148 32 157 220 
     Bulgaria Total -176 -344 -311 -274 -238 -162 -75 -212 -219 -196 -146 -138 -102 -214 -303 -250 315 705 864 744 716 724 575 196 
Banca Carpatica -128 -165 -120 -137 -91 -61 -64 -49 -46 -52 -49 -84 -73 -85 -76 -16 -6 5 7 106 103 118 117 101 
Banca Transilvania -345 -472 -402 -478 -368 -246 -236 -310 -210 -212 -86 -197 -310 -514 -667 221 203 248 442 760 389 402 324 298 
Romania Total -473 -638 -522 -615 -459 -307 -299 -359 -256 -264 -135 -282 -383 -599 -744 205 197 253 449 865 492 521 441 399 
Latvijas Krajbanka               -49 -65 -74 -82 -125 -94 -134 -146 -232 -115 -86 -41 -31 -12 6 27 -8 
Latvia Total               -49 -65 -74 -82 -125 -94 -134 -146 -232 -115 -86 -41 -31 -12 6 27 -8 
Bankas Snoras 
       
18 -39 -81 -48 -69 -48 -193 -161 -255 -215 -140 -139 
     Siauliu Bankas -12 -34 -26 -32 -30 -18 -12 -8 -18 -21 -17 -19 -21 -63 -52 -60 -34 2 23 39 62 45 30 26 
Ukio Bankas -5 -79 -74 -88 -92 -53 -40 -24 -57 -75 -47 -56 -68 -136 -114 -170 -122 -52 -4 10 83 72 68 59 
Lithuania Total -17 -114 -100 -120 -122 -71 -52 -14 -114 -177 -112 -144 -137 -393 -327 -485 -372 -189 -120 49 145 117 98 85 
FHB Jelzalogbank -287 -260 -232 -256 -246 -144 -123 -149 -51 -80 21 -34 -52 -234 -279 -211 -111 -65 -22 110 180 212 158 132 
OTP Bank -3476 -3363 -3018 -3742 
-
3346 -585 -834 -1309 -978 
-
1523 -675 -669 -1112 -3087 -5049 -3630 -383 393 888 3178 4151 5354 3538 3876 
Hungary Total 
-
3763 
-
3623 -3250 -3998 
-
3592 -729 -956 -1458 
-
1029 
-
1603 -696 -704 -1164 -3321 -5328 -3841 -493 328 867 3288 4331 5566 3696 4007 
Komercni Banka 1598 1702 2025 1587 1734 3012 3256 3433 2622 2119 2609 2959 2377 1209 227 1429 2596 2451 2650 3670 4013 3453 2824 2105 
Czech R. Total 1598 1702 2025 1587 1734 3012 3256 3433 2622 2119 2609 2959 2377 1209 227 1429 2596 2451 2650 3670 4013 3453 2824 2105 
Bank PEKAO  2584 2942 3107 2437 2210 4243 4707 5434 5118 4292 4919 4815 4407 2191 294 2729 5514 5469 7119 9074 6944 7645 7427 6336 
BRE Bank 3109 2922 -184 -445 -398 591 972 633 276 10 87 216 -1176 -1913 -2757 -1128 365 760 958 2159 2304 2634 2308 1384 
ING Bank -924 -847 370 159 106 610 1171 940 761 604 592 801 298 -926 -1367 -747 -1279 -1425 -1189 -190 378 713 145 447 
Millenium -852 -559 -294 -495 -216 89 356 83 158 -58 -23 -95 -820 
-
1558 -1873 -1200 68 312 664 1423 1518 1814 1524 868 
PKO BP 3598 2964 2628 2361 2831 5917 6420 6588 6479 4391 5726 5320 3427 1614 551 3721 5583 6442 6299 8545 9401 9594 8046 7916 
Bank HANDLOWY 142 528 -803 -2862 -2228 -1543 -1837 1104 927 557 688 431 99 -333 -719 -418 213 774 942 1354 1824 2310 1344 1122 
BOS Bank -276 -292 -248 -289 -187 -157 -125 -141 -97 -82 -40 -12 -93 -97 -71 -17 -66 -68 -40 -27 4 -9 33 28 
Bank BPH -543 -701 -640 -841 -549 -332 -29 -74 
-
3582 
-
4120 -3256 -4300 
-
2423 
-
2623 -2941 -6628 -1786 -1667 -1576 -1501 -1133 -953 -1047 -1119 
Poland Total 6838 6956 3937 26 1568 9418 
1163
6 
1456
7 
1004
1 5594 8694 7177 3720 -3645 -8883 -3688 8611 
1059
7 
1317
7 
2083
7 
2124
0 
2374
7 
1978
0 
1698
1 
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Table 3 Panel data sources and descriptions 
Variable Source  Kind of observation 
SRISK Own calculation (BS- model) based on bank's balance 
sheet & market data from Reuters Eikon 
Yearly observation from each CEE banking systems 
LIQUIDITY Reuters Eikon data Yearly observation from each CEE money market 
MONETARY Reuters Eikon data Yearly observation from each CEE central banks 
VIX 
Reuters Eikon data Yearly observation from Chicagi Board Options 
Exchange CBOE  
CAP WORLD BANK data base Yearly observation from each CEE stock exchanges 
MMR Reuters Eikon data Yearly observation from each CEE money markets 
GDP OECD data base Yearly observation from each CEE countries 
HHI WORLD BANK data base Yearly observation from each CEE banking systems 
NPL WORLD BANK data base Yearly observation from each CEE banking systems 
CAPITAL WORLD BANK data base Yearly observation from each CEE banking systems 
LEVERAGE Own calculation (BS- model) based on bank's balance 
sheets 
Yearly observation from selected commercial banks 
LIQUIDITY GAP Own calculation (BS- model) based on bank's balance 
sheets 
Yearly observation from selected commercial banks 
ROA WORLD BANK data base Yearly observation from each CEE banking systems 
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Table 4 Panel model determinantes descriptive statistics 
Variable Average Median Min Max Standard deviation 
SRISK -0,2536 -0,2088 -4,8356 2,8034 1,3545 
LIQUIDITY 0,5353 0,4000 0,0800 2,0000 0,4211 
MONETARY -0,2402 -0,0897 -2,7081 0,5577 0,6438 
VIX 0,0573 -0,0432 -0,6125 0,6660 0,4376 
CAP -0,0825 -0,0408 -1,2174 0,8219 0,4924 
MMR 0,0404 0,0486 -0,1249 0,2036 0,0541 
GDP -0,3776 -0,0770 -3,6938 1,6983 1,0512 
HHI 0,0985 0,0871 0,0559 0,1913 0,0357 
NPL 0,2618 0,1295 -0,3282 1,8214 0,5024 
CAPITAL -0,0110 0,0853 -0,8800 0,2977 0,2947 
LEVERAGE 0,3818 0,2495 -0,2082 1,9414 0,6224 
LIQUIDITY GAP 0,0897 0,0997 -0,0766 0,2262 0,1544 
ROA -0,0309 -0,1154 -0,9800 1,6650 0,5384 
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Table 5 Determinantes of systemic risk in CEE coutry commercial banks. Panel model estimations. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  SRISK 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES: 
Regression 1 
Market  
& macro model 
Regression 2 
Market & macro  
+ Banking sector specific model  
Regression 3 
FINAL  
MODEL  
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Market & macro variables 
SRisk(-1) -0,216614 * -0,00663602 * 0,0371537 * 
SRisk(-2) -0,307965 *** -0,00476545 ** -0,019684 * 
CONST 0,494863 * 0,477856 ** 0,526591 * 
LIQUIDITY 0,989835 * 0,27472  0,255186  
MONETARY 0,180512  0,0563186  0,333324  
VIX 1,2212 * 0,95078 * 1,29886 * 
CAP -0,972679 ** -0,979241 *** -1,31744 *** 
MMR 0,0036472 * 0,0010831  0,0089161  
GDP -0,107193  -0,129886  -1,4097e-06  
Banking sector 
specific variables 
HHI   0,431 ** 0,8568 *** 
NPL   0,08496 * 0,44014 ** 
Bank individual 
specific variables 
CAPITAL     0,113202  
LEVERAGE     0,0091452 * 
LIQUIDITY GAP     0,0001523 * 
ROA     0,435684  
Tests 
MA1 0.0123 0.0190  0.0000   
MA2 0.2205 0.1931 0.1628 
Sargan test 0.0752 0.0907 1.0000  
Source: own study 
 
